According to both deontologists and consequentialists, if there is a reason to promote the general happiness – or to promote any other state of affairs unrelated to one's own projects or self-interest – then the reason must apply to everyone. This view seems almost self-evident; to challenge it is to challenge the way we think of moral reasons. I contend, however, that the view depends on the unwarranted assumption that the only way to restrict the application scope of a reason (...) for action is by restricting it to those agents whose interests or projects are involved in the reason. In fact normative theories may coherently restrict application scopes in other ways. Thus we must take seriously the possibility that the reason to promote the general happiness, although genuine, does not apply to everyone. (shrink)

B C Hurst; Means, Ends, Content and Objectives in Curriculum Planning: a critique of Sockett and Hirst, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1.

It is often taken for granted that there is a crucial dichotomy between positive science, with its interest in what is the case, and morality, with its supposed interest in what ought to be the case. This assumption takes its departure from a belief in the notion of unconditional or categorical obligation or ?the moral? as ?that whose nature it is to be required or demanded?. The notion of unconditional or categorical obligation, together with the assumption that there is a (...) dichotomy between considerations of what is the case and what ought to be the case, however widespread and entrenched this notion and assumption might be, are logically confused. But to demonstrate this logical confusion is not the only task confronting ethical theory. Another, and often neglected task, is to draw attention to the ethical origins of this confusion in a particular way of life. Hegel's distinction between Moralität (Moral Life) and Sittlichkeit (Ethical Life) is of critical importance here. The obstacle to the development of ethical theory, then, is not some abstract ?logical confusion?, but is, rather, the way of life (Moral Life) of which this confusion is a natural expression. (shrink)

In the Classical Quarterly, xlix , Mrs. A. D. Ure mentions a Corinthian pyxis which had been previously published by her in the Journal of Hellenic Studies, lxix. 19 f. . This vase, at first believed to be of Boeotian origin, appears to come from Corinth, as subsequently shown by Mrs. Ure in J.H.S. lxxii. 121. Its subject is quite well known, consisting of an unbearded figure dressed in a fawn-skin with two horns growing from its head, and sitting on (...) what very probably is a heap of corn. In his right hand he is holding a staff thickened at the head, and in his left a stick terminating in forklike prongs. The figure is flanked on the right by a small animal and on the left by a basket of fruit. (shrink)

Excerpt from Der Gesetzesbegriff Beim Hl; Thomas von Aquin im Lichte des Rechtsstudiums Seiner Zeit Es war der Name des hl. Thomas von Aquin, der da von Juristen öfters wegen seiner Bedeutung für die juridische Wissenschaft zitiert wurde. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst (...) repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Philosophers of history can be divided into two schools, the realist/ empiricist and the instrumentalist/ constructionist. Both accept that the evidence of the past is given. The "myth of evidence," however, obscures the problematic character of description and prediction as essential activities of historians and archaeologists. To choose between competing claims about a particular event one does not choose between the individual descriptions. Rather, one chooses those narratives with the wider network of truth statements and predictive powers. Once the "myth (...) of evidence" is dispelled, the philosophy of history should provide analyses and programs of data-description and prediction. (shrink)

Climo and Howells argue that a comparison of counterfactual statements is the best approach to causation in historical analysis. In historical explanation, it is often difficult to distinguish causes from effects, real causes from potential ones, and epiphenomena from either causes or effects. The symbolic statement "A causes B" describes the actual world. Two statements using the parameters A and B may be formed which do not describe the actual world. By determining which of the statements, "If not-A then B" (...) and "If not-A then not-B," is closer to the actual world, one can conclude whether A is a cause of B. Despite their claims, however, Climo and Howells do not prove that their method is superior to others in dealing with effects and preemption. Their method also has internal difficulties when dealing with epiphenomena and relations to the actual world. (shrink)

An attempt is made here to examine the analysis three political thinkers - Thomas Paine, William Godwin, and Jeremy Bentham have offered of the idea of equality. The inquiry underrtaken is philosophical and not historical in character, since no attempt is made either at tracing the influence ht the biographical-cum-intellectual level of one of them upon the other or at treating their ideas on equality as born out of their preoccupation with the same problem to which they give various answers (...) and which can therefore be considered within a single overall framework. Instead, each thinker is considered independently. And a study is undertaken of the way he understands equality, the way he justifies it, the sort of equality he considers most important and his reasons for this, the area of life he takes the idea of equality to illuminate, the manner in which he relates it to other ideas, etc.. In each case, a fairly coherent philosophy of equality is sought to be constructed out of their respective writings. These three thinkers are selected for two reasons. The idea of equality looms quite large in their thought; as such, it was felt that looking at their writings from the standpoint of equality may illuminate their certain features that may otherwise remain obscure or relatively underemphasized. Further, as they consider equality from different philosophical positions it was believed that a critical examination of their writings could, perhaps, point to the general merits and limitations of their respective positions in terms of equality. in chapter I, it is argued that there are distinct views of God discernible in Paine's writings, and that corresponding to them are three distinct views of equality, though only two of them are discussed by Paine at any length. in chapter II, it is argued that, though Godwin begins as a thoroughgoing rationalist, three are shifts in his general philosophical position, and that, with each shift, his ideas on truth, rationality and equality undergo important changes. Finally, in chapter III, it is argued that there are two distinct theories of equality in Bentham and that tension between them remains unresolved. (shrink)

Rule utilitarianism as commonly formulated has the undesired implication that in case wrong has been done, Any act whatsoever is right. This is due to the fact that in setting the criterion for a set of rules which confers rightness, Rule utilitarians fail to require that obedience to the rules in situations of less than universal obedience must result in the most good attainable in those situations. I suggest a rule-Utilitarian criterion which remedies this defect and which, Borrowing from brandt, (...) Also guarantees that the public acknowledgement of the rules would be desirable. (shrink)

Originally published in 1967 as the fifth edition of a 1935 original, this book addresses the teaching of various kinds of geography to secondary school students. The text includes suggestions for classwork and possible field courses, in order that geography may have 'its maximum educational effect'. This book will be of value to anyone interested in the history of geography education in Britain.